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Abstract
This paper presents estimation of the Grossman-Helpman (1994) model for the EU.
We try to address a number of pitfalls that surround the previous empirical literature.
First, we suggest a new identification strategy that enables to single out politically or-
ganized sectors with specific regard to trade policy. Second, we utilize two alternative
measures of trade protection (ad-valorem equivalent of non-tariﬀ barriers and overall
restrictiveness) and adopt industrial and trade data at a high level of disaggregation.
Finally, we directly obtain the structural coeﬃcients of the model by estimating a non-
linear simultaneous equations system that is tightly linked to theory. We find that the
theoretical model is broadly consistent with data and conclusions turn out internally
coherent.
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1 Introduction
The protection-for-sale model by Grossman and Helpman (1994)1 is one of the main ref-
erence points for the empirical literature in the political economy of trade. It aims at mi-
crofounding the behavior of organized lobbies and politicians in order to derive a clear-cut
expression for the level of endogenous protection as a function of industry characteristics.
Very diﬀerent implications for the structure of trade protection are derived depending on
whether a given sector is organized in a lobby or not. In particular, the model predicts that:
(i) protection is higher in organized sectors than in unorganized ones; and (ii) protection is
a decreasing (increasing) function of the trade penetration ratio and of the trade elasticity
in the organized (unorganized) sectors.
The GH model has been tested by a number of studies that provide evidence in support
of its predictions: Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) and Goldberg and Maggi (1999)
for the United States; Mitra et al. (2002) for Turkey; McCalman (2004) for Australia.
Furthermore, in the more recent literature, it has oﬀered the basis to a number of extensions
and adaptations for the analysis of related topics: quotas’ trade restrictions (Facchini et
al. 2006), foreign versus domestic lobbies (Krishna et al., 2006); lobbying for upstream
versus lobbying for downstream industries (Gawande and Krishna, 2005); the eﬀects of
preferential trade agreements on multilateral trade liberalization (Karacaovali and Limão,
2005); national versus supranational lobbying in the EU (Belloc and Guerrieri, 2007). The
mentioned empirical approaches to the political economy of trade policy are however not
free from concerns that shelter on data issues, the empirical strategy adopted (especially to
identify organized groups), and the consistency of the estimation results with the theoretical
framework. In this paper we estimate the GH model for the European Union (1999 − 15
countries). Our empirical strategy is designed to face some of the weaknesses that have
been ascribed to previous empirical tests of this model.
The economic literature has recently started to show an increasing attention on European
policy formation and interest groups from both theoretical (Broscheid and Cohen, 2003;
Cohen, 1997; Crombez, 2002), and empirical (Karacaovali and Limão, 2005; Belloc and
Guerrieri, 2007; Balaoing and Francois, 2006; Belfrage, 2004) points of view. Yet, the
absence of data on political contributions has so far made it impossible to appropriately
identify lobbies within the EU arena2. Our paper is the first to attempt an estimation of
1Hereafter GH.
2For instance, Karacaovali and Limão (2005) modify the GH model to study the eﬀects of preferential trade
agreements upon multilateral trade liberalization. However, in their paper, the authors assume that all the industry
are organized. The same assumption is made by Belfrage (2004). Belloc and Guerrieri (2007) aim at evaluating
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the GH model using European trade and industrial data and employing an identification
strategy designed to distinguish organized from unorganized sectors with a special regard
to trade policy.
While the European institutional environment departs from that characterizing the
United States’ (which has inspired the protection-for-sale framework) in a host of diﬀerent
ways, in this work we have decided to not significantly detach from the original theoretical
model. It follows that the test conducted in this paper has to be interpreted as a test for the
European Union behaving as a single entity that negotiates with its trade partners relying
on a common trade policy. This is in line with the reference model presented by the Treaty
Establishing the European Community. Article 133 declares: “The common commercial
policy shall be based on uniform principles, particularly in regard to changes in tariﬀ rates,
the conclusion of tariﬀ and trade agreements, the achievement of uniformity in measures of
liberalization, export policy and measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in the
event of dumping or subsidies”3.
Generally speaking, the measures for lobbying action at the EU level are similar to na-
tional ones: political pressure, economic contributions, information provision, and so on.
However, the policy making environment that characterizes the EU is more complex as it
relies on a very open and decentralized decision process (Mazey and Richardson, 1993).
Before the adoption of the Single European Act in 1986, the policy-making was mainly in
the hands of the Council of Ministers and, as a consequence, most of the EU lobbying was
wielded by national groups through political and administrative channels. After 1986 this
situation has changed: the Commission was endowed with the power to initiate EU policies
and became a crucial actor in the formulation of policy proposals. This entailed a special
need for coalition-building at the EU level at the early stages of the lobbying process. Un-
like the Council, the Commission is meant to be a supranational body. As a consequence,
commissioners are supposed to be independent of member states in taking their decisions.
Furthermore, the Commission is essentially a technical bureaucracy that resorts in large
measure to private actors to gather information needed to draft legislation. Thus, lob-
bies represent an important source of grass-roots information and play a very active role
during the legislative process: they bring issues to the policy makers’ attention, provide
information, and often take part in the committees (Directorates-General) that assist the
the distinct roles of national and supranational special interest groups in the EU. They approximate the political
organization dummy resorting to proxies such as the industry scale.
3Furthermore, Belloc and Guerrieri (2007) find that the eﬀects of national and European lobbies on protection are
very similar.
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Commission in preparing proposals (Broscheid and Cohen, 2003). The previous consider-
ations suggest that participation in oﬃcial meetings on trade issues is very informative to
track lobbying for trade policy at the European level. This motivates our identification
strategy as it is explained in the next sections.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the main
predictions of the GH model and analyses the previous approaches used to test them. Also
it reviews some of the critiques moved against these tests and presents how they are intended
to be overcome here. Section 3 introduces the empirical strategy and the data used in the
present work. Sections 4 and 5 present respectively the core results and the robustness
checks. Section 6 draws the conclusions.
2 Previous literature
2.1 The GH model
The intriguing feature of the GH model is the microfoundation of the behavior of organized
lobbies and politicians to derive a clear-cut expression for the level of endogenous protection
as a function of industry characteristics. While the GH model is too well known to be
repeated here, in what follows we recall its most important elements.
There is a small open economy and the rest-of-the-world. Among the several goods
produced, one (the numeraire) is obtained using only labor, while all the others require
labor and a sector specific factor. The economy is populated by a number of individuals
identical in every relevant respect but factor endowments: all of them own labor but only
some also possess a specific factor (at most one). Each individual is welfare maximizer.
Her income consists of three elements: labor income, government transfer, and, possibly,
rewards from the ownership of the specific factor. Specific factor owners gain from higher
protection in their sector. Then, a number of them manage to get organized in order to
sheer government’s decisions in their favor. To this purpose the lobby group can spend
a part of her resources in political contributions that are perceived by the government.
Hence, while the lobbies maximize their net-of-contributions welfare, the government aims
at maximizing the weighted sum of aggregate general welfare and the contributions from
the pressure groups, that is:
G =
P
i∈L
Ci + aW (1)
whereW is gross-of-contribution social welfare, Ci is the contribution schedule for group i, L
is the number of groups organized in lobbies and a the relative weight that the government
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attaches to aggregate welfare with respect to special interests. The policy game can be
solved in two steps. In the first stage the organized interest groups define the amount of
resources to allocate to lobbying action, taking as given the decisions of the other groups.
In the second stage, after including the contribution schedules in her welfare function, the
government defines the level of trade protection. This is finally given by:
ti
1 + ti
=
Ii − αL
αL + a
· zi
ei
(2)
where ti is a measure of trade protection, Ii is a dummy variable that equals one if sector i
is organized and zero otherwise, zi is the inverse of the trade penetration ratio (production
over imports -exports- for import -export- competing industries), ei the import-demand
(export-supply) elasticity. αL and a are the structural parameters of interest: the former
represents the fraction of voting population that owns a specific factor, while the latter is
the weight that the government attaches to aggregate social welfare.
Three main predictions can be obtained from equation (2): (i) protection is higher in
organized sectors than in unorganized ones; and (ii) protection is a decreasing (increas-
ing) function of the trade penetration ratio and of the trade elasticity in the organized
(unorganized) sectors4.
2.2 Previous empirical approaches and related issues
The GH model has been verified by a number of works considering diﬀerent countries and
adopting alternative econometric techniques (see section 3). These tests have however risen
concerns and critiques that dwell upon data, methodological issues as well as problems of
internal coherence for the results obtained (Imai et al. 2006; Gawande and Krishna, 2003;
Mitra et al., 2006). They are briefly presented in this subsection where we also explain how
we intend to deal with them.
A) Political organization variable
Let us start with concerns regarding the data used in the empirical tests. The first
is related to the identification of industries that are politically organized to sheer trade
policy. Since a political organization variable is not directly observable, the construction
of the dummy Ii used in equation (2) must largely rely on subjective elements. Gawande
and Bandyopadhyay (2000) and Goldberg and Maggi (1999) resort to corporate campaign
contributions and define as organized industries that allocate resources to political contri-
butions over a certain cutoﬀ level. This choice presents a major problem: we cannot clearly
4See Helpman (1995) for a comparative evaluation of these predictions with those obtained by previous political
economy approaches to trade policy.
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distinguish the amount of money that lobbies address to sway trade policy’s decisions from
those that are directed to other aims (for instance domestic support not related to trade).
To deal with this, Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) run an auxiliary regression to as-
sociate contributions to purely trade-related variables. However, in our case contributions
data simply do not exist, as they would denote illegal activities in European countries. Then
we have to come out with a diﬀerent strategy. With regard to the EU, Karacaovali and
Limão (2005) circumvent the problem assuming that all the industries are organized, while
Belloc and Guerrieri (2007) use proxy variables that suﬀer from the same limitation above
illustrated. Outside the EU, another couple of options are suggested by Mitra et al. (2002)
and McCalman (2004). The former first map the membership to one of the most important
Turkish industrialist organizations (the TUSIAD5); then validate the identification made
by statistical discriminant and probit estimation techniques (see subsection 3.3). Again the
identification cannot capture pure trade policy concerns being the TUSIAD a general (both
domestic and international) interest business organization. Finally, McCalman (2000)’s
strategy is based on information by Australian trade policy institutions. Considering the
Australian practice of reviewing any operation of trade policy by an independent advisory
body (the “Tariﬀ Board”), the author classifies an industry as organized if a Tariﬀ Board
report was prepared in the given period. While this strategy has the merit to only focus on
trade policy, it remains specific to Australia. Our identification methodology is specifically
designed to fit the EU institutional environment.
We use data from the EU Directorate-General for Trade6 to single out organizations
registered to take part in the Civil Society Dialog7. This holds regular meetings on external
trade matters between the European Commissioner for Trade, senior Commission oﬃcials
and trade negotiators. In this way we attain two goals. On the one hand, we tackle a specific
feature of the EU institutional arena, where lobbying is wielded mainly at the early stages
of the policy formation by information provision to and negotiations with the European
Commission. On the other, we are able to focus on interest groups with pure trade policy
concerns. The evident weakness of this strategy is that we can consider only pressure made
at the European level and overlook the national channels. Yet, as explained above, this
choice is in line with the practice following the ratification of the Single European Act in
1986 (see for instance, Mazey and Richardson, 1993).
5Turkish Industrialists and Businessman Association.
6Hereafter DG-Trade.
7The original dataset that summarizes information on the registered organizations has been compiled by Dür and
De Bièvre (2006). More details on this below.
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B) Measure of trade protection
Second, the dependent variable in the original GH (1994) model is tariﬀs. However,
while in the theoretical framework the policy maker acts as a noncooperative player, in the
real world tariﬀs are set cooperatively within the WTO arena. This observation has led the
protection-for-sale empirical literature to focus on non-tariﬀ barriers (NTBs) as a measure
for protection. The choice between tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ barriers as right-hand variable is
fraught with important implications (Gawande and Krishna, 2003). Indeed, pure NTB
coverage ratios are likely to exhibit large measurement errors that can lead to either over-
estimate or under-estimate the extent of protection. On the other hand, adopting tariﬀs
alone would imply, beyond inconsistency with the noncooperative nature of the policy game,
large imprecisions given the great use of new trade protectionist measures made by national
governments in the recent periods. In this paper we employ ad-valorem equivalents of trade
protection constructed by Kee et al. (2006). This measure has two major advantages: first,
restrictiveness is estimated at the tariﬀ line level, that is the level of disaggregation at which
trade policy is set. Protection measured at the aggregated industry level would indeed be
likely to generate severe aggregation bias. Second, Kee et al. (2006) calculate, besides
the ad-valorem equivalent of non-tariﬀ barriers, that of overall trade restrictiveness which
includes both tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ measures. This is expected to capture the true extent of
protection at an acceptable degree of precision even in the presence of combination of old
and new protectionist measures.
C) Measure of the trade price elasticities
Third, the estimation of model (2) requires data on import-demand (export-supply)
elasticities that in turn must be estimated. Trade price elasticities used in this paper are
provided by Kee et al. (2004) and are suitable for our study for a number of reasons. First,
they are disaggregated at the tariﬀ line level (more than 4000 products in our case) so to
maintain consistency with the level of disaggregation of the protection measure and with
the trade policy formation process. This is important since we expect the trade elasticities
to be the larger, the higher the level of disaggregation. As a consequence, using more
aggregated data for import-demand (export-supply) elasticities than for protection would
lead to an under-estimation of the welfare costs of protectionist trade policies. Second,
they are obtained by a methodology that is coherent with trade theory and by the same
data sources for each country (then for all the 15 countries included in our investigation)
and good considered. Finally, the estimates obtained present a good degree of accuracy.
Considering the overall study by Kee et al. (2004) (that includes 117 countries), 89% of the
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elasticities are statistically significant at the 1% level, 91% at the 5% and 93% at the 10%.
D) Estimation, results and their interpretation
The last issue is a general concern about the political economy approach to trade theory
in the light of the estimation results obtain by the already mentioned empirical studies.
As emphasized by some critical articles (Imai et al., 2006; Gawande and Krishna, 2003;
Mitra et al., 2006), but also noted by the original empirical works on the GH model (e.g.
Gawande and Bandyopadhyay, 2000), the estimated value of a is very large (for instance
for the United States it ranges between 100 and 3000). The larger is a, the more the
government behaves as a welfare maximizer, and the less she cares about political pressure
by interest groups. Although this results does not invalidate the theoretical framework since
no clear expectations are suggested on the magnitude of a, the fact that the government
seems not very exposed to political pressure lobbying hints that the political economy
approach is not the best choice for trade policy analysis. Actually, a large value of a is
not a discouraging result in itself as far as 1/a is statistically diﬀerent from zero (what
means that the government distinguishes between special and general interests). But, a
large value of a is not realistic if associated to the large estimates of the parameter αL that
come out from the previous empirical studies (between 0.85 and 0.98 for the United States).
According to Mitra et al. (2006) the internal contradiction of this conclusion hinges on the
unappealing result that a so large fraction of the voting population (between 85% and 95%)
finds the resources to get organized in the presence of a government that is not exposed
to the political pressure they exert. Mitra et al. (2006) suggest two major reasons for
this unrealistic conclusion. On the one hand, the empirical strategy must be more tightly
linked to theory, that is, equation (2) should not be contaminated with additional terms
not included in the GH model. On the other, all the sectors should be treated as organized
as they all enjoy a positive (or non-negative) protection in the various countries object of
study. The latter comment is also tied to point A), that relating to the diﬃculty in singling
out the industries that wield their influence for exclusive trade policy concerns.
While in this paper we carefully follow the former suggestion in designing our econometric
strategy (see subsection 3.1), we have chosen to distinguish organized from unorganized
sectors. Indeed, as already noted, our data from the DG-Trade allow us to identify those
organizations that take part in the European policy negotiations with a specific interest
for external trade policy. This not only makes our investigation more interesting, but also
enables us to simultaneously identify the two parameters a and αL.Without an identification
strategy for lobby groups (i.e. setting the variable Ii always equal to one in equation (2))
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we could only estimate the parameter on zi/ei (let us say b = (1− αL) / (αL + a)) and infer
one between αL and a after setting the other equal to an exogenously chosen constant (see
Mitra et al., 2006).
3 Empirical strategy
3.1 Econometric model
Estimation of model (2) presents some issues that we need to tackle carefully. First, the
trade price elasticity (ei), entering model (2) as an explanatory variable, is not observed, but
is estimated with possibly severe measurement errors. Two strategies have been suggested
by the literature to deal with this: either moving ei on the left-hand side as in Goldberg
and Maggi (1999) and McCalman (2004), or keeping it on the right-hand side and using
instrumental variables estimation as in Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) and Mitra et
al. (2002). Even if we believe the trade price elasticities provided by Kee et al. (2004) are
estimated at an good degree of precision for the reasons exposed in subsection 2.2.C, we
cannot exclude the existence of measurement errors. To deal with this, we have decided
to adopt the first strategy; this is mainly motivated by the choice illustrated below of
implementing simultaneous equations system.
Second, zi and Ii can turn out to be endogenously determined in the model. Again two
approaches are possible. Simultaneous equations system estimation is chosen by Goldberg
and Maggi (1999) (FIML8) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) (Kelejian, 1971,’s
2SLS9 estimator). Single equation and instrumental variables estimation is employed by
Mitra et al. (2002) (both 2SLS and panel-GMM10) and McCalman (2004) (2SLS). We
have decided to use simultaneous equations estimation by FIML, but, departing from the
previous studies adopting this methodology, we directly estimate model (2) in its nonlinear
form (for FIML estimation of nonlinear equation systems see Chow, 1973). Despite the
additional computational and specification costs, the evident advantage of applying nonlin-
ear econometric techniques consists in immediately obtaining the structural parameters and
their standard errors. Furthermore, under correct model specification, FIML estimation is
fully eﬃcient.
8FIML stands for full information maximum likelihood.
9 2SLS stands for two-stage least squares.
10GMM stands for generalized method of moments.
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We estimate the following model:
tiei
1 + ti
= c0 +
1
αL + a
· Ii · zi − αLαL + a · zi + εi (3)
ln zi = c1 + β
0
1 ln∆1i + ζ1i (4)
Ii = c2 + β
0
2 ln∆2i + ζ2i (5)
where c0, c1 and c2 are constant terms, εi, ζ1i and ζ2i are the additive residual terms, ∆1i
and ∆2i are vectors of industrial variables, β1 and β2 are vectors of parameters, and finally
“ 0 ” stands for transposed. Although the intercept, c0, is not directly derived by the theory
in equation (3), it is useful to statistically justify the fact that all sectors (either organized
or not) are associated to a positive (or non-negative) level of protection. The system formed
by equations (3), (4) and (5) is estimated by FIML.
3.2 Data description
Data on protection are from Kee et al. (2006) and are at the 6-digit of the Harmonized
System11. We employ two measures of protection: ad-valorem equivalent of core NTBs and
ad-valorem equivalent of overall protection (tariﬀ, domestic support and NTBs).
The main problem in measuring trade protection barriers is that trade policy can take a
host of diﬀerent forms: tariﬀs, quotas, antidumping duties, technical regulations, monopo-
listic measures, subsidies, and so on. To solve this problem it is necessary to convert all the
information contained in the non-tariﬀ impediments to trade into an ad-valorem equivalent
that is directly comparable to a tariﬀ. This goal is attained by Kee et al. (2006) mainly
following Anderson and Neary (see in particular 1994 and 2004). They rely on two broad
classes of NTBs: the so called “core NTBs” (namely price and quantity control measures,
technical regulations, monopolistic measures) and agricultural domestic support. For each
of them Kee et al. (2006) estimate the eﬀects on imports adopting the comparative ad-
vantage approach. The latter has its theoretical foundation in a multi-good multi-factor
general equilibrium model with log-linear utilities and log-linear constant returns to scale
technologies (see in particular Leamer, 1990). The obtained quantity impact is then trans-
formed into a price equivalent by using the trade elasticities. This gives directly the first
measure of protection that we employ in this paper (NTB-core). The second is a composite
index that combines the ad-valorem equivalent of core NTBs with ad-valorem equivalent of
the domestic support and tariﬀ barriers (overall-protection).
11Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS) is a universally accepted classification system for
tradable goods. The core system identifies basic commodities by a 6-digit number. A complete list of HS codes and
product descriptions is available at http://www.foreign-trade.com/reference/hscode.htm
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Import-demand (export-supply) elasticities are provided by Kee et al. (2004) and are
disaggregated at the 6-digit of the HS.
The variable zi is defined as the ratio of domestic output over imports or exports de-
pending on whether the sector is import or export-competing. External trade series are
obtained from the Eurostat. They consist in extra-EU trade statistics and cover the trading
of goods between a member state and a non-member country. For “goods” are intended all
movable properties. Data are at the 6-digit level of disaggregation according to HS.
To calculate zi we also need data on production. We faced two possible options: to
take production series from the Eurostat - Industry, Trade and Services database that pro-
vides quite complete series aggregated at the 4-digit level according to NACE Rev 1.112
(as Karacaovali and Limão, 2005), or get it from the Eurostat - PRODCOM database that
oﬀers more incomplete series but disaggregated at 8-digit according to the PRODCOM13
classification system. Using the latter rather than the former leads us to lose several obser-
vations and expose us to some problems of reclassification but allows to exploit the more
detailed information embedded in the disaggregated data. The PRODCOM classification
is directly linked to HS so to maintain the same level of disaggregation as the trade series.
Since the number of observations we have at our disposal using the PRODCOM data is
very large (1597 products), we decided to opt for this dataset14. In this way we can obtain
more accurate estimation results. Nonetheless, as a robustness check, we also replicate the
estimation using the more aggregated production data (see section 5). Conclusions do not
change in any significant way.
Finally we need data on industrial characteristics employed entering regressions (4) and
(5). They are provided by the Eurostat by country and detailed on NACE Rev 1.1 at 4-digit
level. The conversion to HS is made possible by international systems concordance tables15.
Industry data are more aggregated than trade data. We are however not very concerned
with this issue since (4) and (5) are not the primary object of our empirical analysis.
Yet, since errors in the estimation of these equations are likely to aﬀect the estimation of
12NACE Rev. 1.1 is a 4-digit activity classification used by the European Union since 2002. More details are
available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ramon/relations/index.cfm
13PRODCOM is a system for the collection and dissemination of data on the production of manufactured products.
PRODCOM headings are derived from HS; this enable comparisons between production and foreign trade data.
14We implemented reclassification from PRODCOM to HS by concordance tables available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ramon/relations/index.cfm
15The classification of economic activities according to NACE Rev. 1.1 corresponds to ISIC Rev.3 at European level.
Even though the former is more disaggregated than the latter, it is totally coherent with it and can be considered its
European counterpart. We have then first passed from NACE 1.1 to ISIC 3 and then from ISIC 3 to HS. Concordance
tables from NACE to ISIC 3 are available at: http://www.fifoost.org/database/nace/nace-en_2002c.php, whereas
correspondence tables from ISIC 3 to HS are courtesy of Colin Webb (OECD).
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equation (3), we control for the accuracy in the estimation of each equation in the model
and, as a robustness check, we also estimate regression (3) alone obtaining unchanged
qualitative conclusions. Industrial variables included are: measure of industry scale; share
of turnover in production value; investments in long-term rentals, investments in tangible
goods, investments in land, investments in existing buildings, investments in constructions;
labor share; percentage of agency workers, unpaid persons, apprentices, R&D personnel,
and employees in total of persons employed; share of social security costs in total of wages
and salaries; value added per person employed; share of personnel costs in production value;
wage; share of production value in total manufacturing, share of persons employed in total
manufacturing, and percentage of enterprises in total manufacturing.
The construction of the political organization dummy is described in subsection 3.3.
We conclude this subsection with some notes on the sample used and the aggregation
procedures. Our study considers the European Union in 1999 consisting in (ordered by
accession date): Belgium, France, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Germany, Denmark,
Ireland, United Kingdom, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Austria, Finland, and Sweden. The
model is estimated for the EU as a whole. Tariﬀs and NTB ad-valorem equivalents are
already provided from source for the EU as a whole, as well as imports and exports (that is
extra-EU trade). Production and total employment are aggregated by simple sum. Finally,
ratios (for instance ratios over GDP or total employment) and elasticities are aggregated by
weighted sum. The weights used in the aggregation are given by the share of the individual
country’s constant GDP (millions of euro at 1995 prices and exchange rates) over total GDP
for EU15 in 199916.
3.3 Political organization dummy
The political organization dummy is not observable. Then we need to come out with a
strategy that enables us to identify sectors that are organized to wield pressure on the
European government with regard to trade policy decisions. To attain this goal, we have
proceeded in two steps. First, we construct some priors on the base of data from the
European Commission DG-Trade as explained below, then we validate our identification by
means of discriminant function analysis, cluster analysis and probit estimation techniques17.
1) The Civil Society Dialogue-External Trade (European Commission DG-Trade) holds
16Weights used in the aggregation are: Belgium (0.0322), Denmark (0.0208), Germany (0.2781), Greece (0.0137),
Spain (0.0716), France (0.1786), Ireland (0.0103), Italy (0.1231), Netherlands (0.0506), Austria (0.0276), Portugal
(0.0138), Finland (0.0162), Sweden (0.0290), UK (0.1319), Luxemburg (0.0026).
17A similar strategy is also used by Mitra et al. (2002).
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regular meetings on trade issues in Brussels with the European Commissioner for Trade, se-
nior Commission oﬃcials and trade negotiators. The main goal of these meetings is to foster
confident working relationship between all interested stakeholders in trade policy issues and
to gather the grass-roots information that the Commission necessitates to draft legislation.
The DG-Trade maintains a database of all the civil society organizations registered to take
part in the Civil Society Dialogue - External Trade18. Dür and De Bièvre (2006) collected
data on all the organizations in the database including information on whether or not it is
European-wide, i.e. representative of a membership or stakeholders are from all over the
EU. Relying on this set of data we have coded the organizations included in the database
according to the ISIC Rev. 2 system at the 3-digit level. If, in a given sector, there are
at least five European-wide organizations registered in the Civil Society Dialogue External
Trade, the dummy Ii is set equal to one; it is zero otherwise19. Since the other variables
used in the system estimation are classified at the 6-digit of the HS we have implemented a
reclassification from ISIC 2 to HS20. Here, the fact that the political organization dummy
is more aggregated than the trade variables should not create problems as producers, espe-
cially at the European level, have great advantages from organizing at the industry level to
lobby for protection. This is confirmed by the fact that, in the EU, there is more variation
in protection across industries than within them (on this point see also Karacaovali and
Limão, 2005).
In the second stage of our identification strategy we validate our priors defined in point
1) on the bases of three techniques.
2.a) The discriminant function analysis (DFA)21 is a statistical tool to classify cases into
the values of a categorical dependent variable or to test a theory by observing whether
cases are classified as predicted. The ingredients are the dependent variable (in our case
the political organization dummy, Ii, obtained as explained above), and n discriminant
variables (in our case the 20 industrial characteristics included in ∆1i and ∆2i, let us say
x1, x2, ...x20). The categorical variable, or latent variable, is predicted by the discriminant
variables by means of a discriminant, or canonical, function that is as follows:
Ii = b0 + b1x1i + b2x2i + b3x3i + ....bnxn
where bk (k = 0, 1, 2, ...n) are the discriminant coeﬃcients, that looks like a multiple regres-
sion function. The diﬀerence between the discriminant function and a multiple regression
18More information on the registered organizations is available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/
19We have also experienced with alternative cutoﬀ levels; our final conclusions are not altered in any relevant way.
20Concordance tables are available at http://www.macalester.edu/research
21For a detailed treatment of the DFA see for instance Huberty (1994).
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is that the latter maximizes the regression relationship, whereas the former maximizes the
distance between the groups as initially classified in the categorical dependent variable.
Then the classification scores are computed, which means the predicted values of the latent
variable are obtained by applying the discriminant function to the data for a given group
at a time. In symbols:
Sij = bb0j +bb1jx1j +bb2jx2j +bb3jx3j + ....bbnjxnj
where Sj is the score of group j, xkj (k = 0, 1, 2, ...n) is variable xkj as observed for group
j, and bbkj (k = 0, 1, 2, ...n) the estimated discriminant coeﬃcient for group j.
We are now interested in finding out if the model is discriminating, that is if the two
groups (organized and unorganized sectors) as they have been classified according to our
priors are suﬃciently diﬀerent. This information is provided by the Wilks’ lambda given by
the proportion of the total variance in the discriminant scores not explained by diﬀerences
among the groups. It is distributed as a chi-square with the number of degrees of freedom
equal to the number of discriminant variables. A statistically significant lambda induces
to reject the hypothesis that the two groups have the same mean discrimination score.
Furthermore, to test the validity of our preliminary classification we compare pairwise the
predicted categorical variable (I∗i ) with our political organization dummy (Ii). Prediction
is produced as follows: if the discriminant score of the function for a certain object (in our
case a product-line) is less or equal to the cutoﬀ, the case is classified as zero (it goes into
the unorganized group), as one otherwise (it is included among the organized sectors). We
obtain the following results:
Table 1. Discriminant function analysis
Wilks’ lambda 0.3914
Chi-sq (p-val) 3800∗∗∗ (0.0000)
Correctly predicted 90.82%
∗∗∗Significance at 1%
As one can notice, the two groups are statistically diﬀerent. Furthermore our priors are
validated by the model in the 90.82% percent of cases.
2.b) The second validation method is according to cluster analysis22. The way of pro-
ceeding is similar to the previous but does not require an a priori structure of the groups.
Briefly, the cluster analysis is an exploratory data analysis tool with the aim of sorting
diﬀerent objects into groups maximizing (minimizing) the degree of association between
22For a detailed treatment we refer the reader to Everitt et al. (2001).
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objects that belong to the same (diﬀerent) group. In our case we suggest a number of in-
dustrial characteristics that may influence the status of a sector of being organized in lobby
or not, without assuming an a priori categorization. Then the objects (our product-lines)
are divided into two groups, let us say a meaningful structure, on the bases of similarities
(dissimilarities) in such characteristics. Once obtained the new categorization we compare
it with our prior definition of Ii and evaluate the percentage of pairwise matching. We
verify that our measure of the political organization variable as suggested by the DG-Trade
data is validated in the 61.46% of cases.
2.c) Finally we deal with probit estimation and predictions. We estimate a probit re-
gression of Ii (as constructed in point 1) on the already mentioned industrial characteristics
included in ∆1i and ∆2i. Then we generate the prediction using a cutoﬀ probability of 0.6
and compare pairwise the prediction with our measure of political organization. We obtain
that prediction is accurate in the 92.95% of cases.
4 Estimation results
In this section we report estimation results for model (3)-(5) obtained by FIML techniques.
Estimation is repeated using as dependent variable either the ad-valorem equivalent of
NTB-core or the ad-valorem equivalent of the overall protection measure.
We start by commenting the model for NTB-core; results are in table 2. The estimated
value of αL turns out to be equal to 0.4653 whereas the relative weight that the govern-
ment attaches to aggregated social welfare is 148, both being statistically significant at any
conventional level. This conclusion hints that the GH model fits well the EU environment.
Our results suggest that the percentage of organized groups is around 47% of the voting
population. This value seems realistic and coherent with the value of a. Indeed even if Eu-
ropean industrial groups have a large incentive to look for alliances and coalitions given the
complex and decentralized institutional environment they have to face (Mazey and Richard-
son, 1993), the lobby formation at the EU level is a quite recent phenomenon. Hence it is
reasonable that the share of organized groups turns out much smaller than that estimated
for the US by previous studies (that falls in the range 85% − 95%)23. With regard to the
estimated value of a, we observe that, coherently with that found by the previous studies,
it is “large” (in the sense explained in subsection 2.2.D). Hence, we test the hypothesis that
the government is a pure welfare maximizer, i.e. that 1/a equals zero.
23With regards to the EU, Belloc and Guerrieri (2007) obtain that αL equals 0.75. We remark that, however,
in their model αL represents the percentage of national plus European lobbies in total population, then it is not
comparable with that estimated in this paper.
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Table 2. FIML estimation: ti = NTB-Core
Dependent variable: tiei/ (1+ ti) ln zi Ii
coeﬀ. s.e. coeﬀ. s.e. coeﬀ. s.e.
Constant 0.0805∗∗∗ 0.0134 1.1430∗∗∗ 0.1463 -0.0018 0.2452
αL 0.4653∗∗∗ 0.0658
a 147.9427∗∗∗ 17.5316
Scale -0.2902∗∗∗ 0.0919 0.1006∗∗∗ 0.0368
Turnover in prod value 0.4170∗ 0.2249 -0.1958∗∗ 0.0837
Long-term rentals -0.9394∗∗∗ 0.2942 0.2309∗∗ 0.0951
Tangible goods 0.2433∗∗ 0.1168 0.0446 0.0518
Land 1.8222∗∗∗ 0.4291 -0.4587∗∗∗ 0.1674
Existing buildings 0.2465 0.3070 -0.1517 0.1201
Constructions -0.3166∗∗ 0.1526 0.1066 0.0775
Labor share -0.7129∗ 0.3644 1.4688∗∗∗ 0.1085
Agency workers 0.4951∗∗∗ 0.0809 -0.4193∗∗∗ 0.0378
Apprentices 0.1017 0.1316 -0.3068∗∗∗ 0.0528
Unpaid persons -0.3891∗∗∗ 0.0860 0.0800∗∗ 0.0361
R&D personnel -0.4736∗∗∗ 0.0535 -0.1269 0.0233
Employees 0.0775 0.3609 -0.1424 0.1500
Social security -1.2198∗∗∗ 0.4494 -0.2209∗∗∗ 0.1618
Apparent productivity 0.3484 0.3674 0.5435∗∗∗ 0.1329
Personnel costs 1.0646∗∗∗ 0.1938 -0.7994∗∗∗ 0.0773
Wage 0.3197 0.5481 -0.5767∗∗∗ 0.2004
Share prod value 2.0534∗∗∗ 0.2865 -1.0606∗∗∗ 0.1273
Share persons employed -2.3800∗∗∗ 0.3635 1.1312∗∗∗ 0.1545
Share enterprises 29.7059∗∗∗ 5.0943 -5.1392∗∗∗ 1.7190
Observations = 1597
Log likelihood = -3346.514
Akaike information criterion = 4.4363
Schwarz information criterion = 4.5962
∗∗∗Significance at 1%; ∗∗Significance at 5%; ∗Significance at 10%
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Output is in table 4 showing that the null hypothesis is rejected at any confidence level.
Also we test the hypothesis that the fraction of voting population organized in lobbies is
zero, either taken individually or jointly with the previous one. In both cases, we are led to
reject H0. Finally we verify if the sum of the coeﬃcients over zi/ei and I · zi/ei is null; we
conclude that (1− αL) / (a+ αL) is not statistically equal to zero.
To confirm validity of the whole model, we further control if the estimation results for
equation (5) are susceptible of a sensible interpretation. In particular we explore consistency
with predictions suggested by three main theories for endogenous lobby formation (for a
survey see for instance Gawande and Krishna, 2003; and Gawande, 1998): pressure groups
and collective action (Olson, 1965), adding machine (Caves, 1976), and social justice (Ball,
1967; Constantopoulos, 1974; Fieleke, 1976). Pressure groups: industries diﬀer in their
ability to coordinate and get organized in lobbies due to free-riding problems. Accordingly
we expect the probability of a sector to get organized to be the larger, the smaller the
number of enterprises in that sector. As one can notice in table 2, the number of enterprises
has indeed a negative eﬀect on the dependent variable and is statistically significant at any
conventional level. Second, we expect the probability for a sector to be organized to be the
larger, the larger the industry scale (measured by value added per enterprise). The bigger
industry size is associated with larger stakes involved in cooperation among producers to
ask for protection. The larger the industry asking for protection, the greater is the incentive
to take part in the tariﬀ-setting process. Again this prediction is verified by data as the
coeﬃcient associated to industry scale is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level.
Adding machine: a larger number of employees is associated to a larger number of votes in
the elections, then lobbying is likely to be more eﬀective. Consistently we find that the value
of the coeﬃcient associated to the share of employment in total manufacturing is positive
and statistically significant at any confidence level. Social justice: altruistic government
oﬃcials have a special regard for lowest income groups. Then the ability for a sector to
sheer political favor is likely to be the larger, the more numerous low-income workers and
the larger the labor share in that sector. Consistently we find that the probability of
lobbying is linked positively with the number of apprentices, the number of agency workers,
and with the labor share, while it is negatively associated with the average wage. The
other variables included in the equation are mostly controls as there are not unambiguous
theoretical predictions on the eﬀects they exert on the probability of lobbying.
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Table 3. FIML estimation: ti = Overall-protection
Dependent variable: tiei/ (1+ ti) ln zi Ii
coeﬀ. s.e. coeﬀ. s.e. coeﬀ. s.e.
Constant 0.1072∗∗∗ 0.0177 1.1205∗∗∗ 0.14774 -0.0126 0.2618
αL 0.3446∗∗ 0.1414
a 112.6851∗∗∗ 23.7256
Scale -0.2740∗∗∗ 0.0927 0.1080∗∗∗ 0.0379
Turnover in prod value 0.5876∗∗∗ 0.2193 -0.1281 0.0972
Long-term rentals -1.0527∗∗∗ 0.2977 0.1649∗ 0.1000
Tangible goods 0.2678∗∗ 0.1179 0.0620 0.0503
Land 1.9435∗∗∗ 0.4309 -0.3936∗∗ 0.1673
Existing buildings 0.2616 0.3108 -0.1462 0.1273
Constructions -0.3559∗∗ 0.1542 0.0823 0.0760
Labor share -0.6100∗ 0.3684 1.5564∗∗∗ 0.1083
Agency workers 0.4287∗∗∗ 0.0818 -0.4515∗∗∗ 0.0381
Apprentices 0.0426 0.1334 -0.3472∗∗∗ 0.0520
Unpaid persons -0.3970∗∗∗ 0.0857 0.0785∗∗ 0.0374
R&D personnel -0.5070∗∗∗ 0.0537 -0.1455∗∗∗ 0.0232
Employees -0.1376 0.3334 -0.2364 0.1623
Social security -1.3927∗∗∗ 0.4537 -0.3288∗∗ 0.1771
Apparent productivity 0.4462 0.3680 0.5935∗∗∗ 0.1349
Personnel costs 1.1244∗∗∗ 0.1915 -0.7809∗∗∗ 0.0866
Wage 0.2933 0.5524 -0.5800∗∗∗ 0.2114
Share prod value 1.8981∗∗∗ 0.2928 -1.1231∗∗∗ 0.1360
Share persons employed -2.1040∗∗∗ 0.3664 1.2048∗∗∗ 0.1615
Share enterprises 29.4166∗∗∗ 5.0861 -5.0413∗∗∗ 1.7234
Observations = 1597
Log likelihood = -4047.975
Akaike information criterion = 5.3538
Schwarz information criterion = 5.5107
∗∗∗Significance at 1%; ∗∗Significance at 5%; ∗Significance at 10%
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Furthermore, we re-run the system estimation adopting as measure of trade protection
the ad-valorem equivalent of the overall trade restrictiveness index, which includes both
NTB barriers and tariﬀs. Results are shown in table 3 and, as one can notice, are very
similar to those obtained for the very NTB trade protection measure. The values estimated
for respectively αL and a suggest that around the 34% of the voting population succeeds in
organizing in lobbies, and the political weight that the government attaches to aggregated
social welfare is about 113. Also in this case we have conducted hypothesis tests that are
reported in table 4. Again we are led to the same conclusion as above, i.e. to reject the
hypothesis that αL and 1/a are equal to zero, either individually or jointly considered.
Table 4. Hp.s testing
NTB-core Overall protection
H0 Chi-sq p-val Chi-sq p-val
1/a = 0 71.2108∗∗∗ 0.0000 22.5574∗∗∗ 0.0000
αL = 0 50.0629∗∗∗ 0.0000 5.9384∗∗ 0.0148
1/a = 0, αL = 0 71.3364∗∗∗ 0.0000 59.7329∗∗∗ 0.0000
(1− αL) / (a+ αL) = 0 183.4740∗∗∗ 0.0000 188.8440∗∗∗ 0.0000
∗∗∗Reject H0 at 1%;
∗∗Reject H0 at 5%.
A possible criticism to the employed estimation strategy is that there may be other variables
beyond the trade penetration ratio and the trade price elasticities that directly aﬀect pro-
tection. To address this point, we also experiment with alternative specifications of model
(3)-(5) including additional regressors in equation (3) and namely: measure of industry
scale, labor share, share of employees in total of persons employed, apparent productivity,
growth rate of imports and total number of persons employed. The exercise is repeated us-
ing alternatively either NTB-core or overall-protection as measure for protection. We verify
that, on the one side, previous qualitative conclusions on the structural coeﬃcients remain
valid (NTB-core: a = 134 with s.e. = 14.8322, and αL = 0.4700 with s.e. = 0.0637; overall-
prot: a = 107 with s.e. = 23.8945, and αL = 0.3510 with s.e. = 0.1495), on the other, none
of the additional variables is statistically significant either individually or jointly considered
(chi-squared statistics for the Wald test of joint significance and the correspondent p-value
equal respectively: NTB-core: χ25 = 7.5828 and p−val = 0.2703; overall-prot: χ25 = 9.38
and p−val = 0.1530). Furthermore, both the Akaike Information Criterion (NTB-core:
AIC = 4.4620; overall-prot: AIC = 5.3741) and the Schwarz Information Criterion (NTB-
core: SIC = 4.6455; overall-prot: SIC = 5.5576) fail to reject the original formulations of
the model.
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Finally, to test for heteroskedasticity we implement a parsimonious version of the gener-
alized White test (see Kelejian, 1982) by regressing the squared residuals from the estimated
model (3)-(5) on a constant, the fitted values of the dependent variables and the squared of
the latter (note that these are functions of the regressors in the original model). The test is
parsimonious in the sense that, given the large number of regressors in our specification, we
do not include the cross-product terms in order to conserve on the degrees of freedom. The
statistics NR2 (where the R2 is that obtained from the auxiliary regression, and N is the
number of included observations) is distributed as a chi-squared with two degrees of free-
dom. In the case of NTB-core the NR2 statistics turns out to be 1.3761 (p-val = 0.5026),
while when we use the overall restrictiveness index it is equal to 0.4465 (p-val = 0.7999).
Hence, we are led not to reject the null hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity.
5 Robustness checks
In this section we challenge the robustness of our core estimation results in a host of diﬀerent
ways.
First we test if the estimation results are sensitive to the choice of the variables used in
regressions (4) and (5) whose specification, even if suggested by the theory, is not directly
derived by a structural theoretical model. We conduct a model specification search by
dropping one variable at a time in the two equations and replicating the simultaneous
system estimation (in other words we replicate the estimation 20 times for 19 diﬀerent
combinations of the initial 20 regressors). In the case NTB-core is chosen as dependent
variable, we obtain that the estimated value for a falls in the range 136 − 181 (always
significant at least at the 1% level), whereas the corresponding value for αL is between
0.5860 and 0.3391 (significant at least at the 5% level). In the case the overall protection
measure is adopted in place of ti, our econometric output suggests that a is within the
interval 105 − 135 (always significant at least at the 5% level) and αL within the interval
0.4566 − 0.2226 (always significant at least at the 5% level but in three cases out of 20).
Sign and significance for the other regressors are unchanged with respect to those listed
in tables 2 and 3. We have also repeated this exercise by dropping two or more variables
obtaining very similar results. Conclusions remain unchanged even estimating regression
(3) as a single equation treating zi and Ii as exogenous variables. Yet the choice of the
specification used for our core results (including all the 20 regressors) is motivated by the
Akaike and Schwarz Information Criteria that suggest it to be preferred with respect to (or
substantially equivalent to) the alternative specifications.
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Second we have re-estimated model (3)-(5) using ti (either standing by NTB-core or
overall trade restrictiveness measure) as dependent variable in place of ti/ (1 + ti). The
estimated parameters are quite consistent with our previous conclusions being a equal to,
respectively for NTB-core and overall protection, 117 (s.e. = 15.6480) and 84 (s.e. =
46.4872), and αL equal to, again respectively for NTB-core and overall protection, 0.5345
(s.e. = 0.0669) and 0.3094 (s.e. = 0.3832). Notice, however, that in the latter case αL turns
out to be not statistically significant.
Third, we verify if our results are aﬀected by any possible measurement error associated
with the trade price elasticities. Following Goldberg and Maggi (1999) we simply replicate
the estimation omitting ei from the specification. Here we are only interested in testing
if the sign and the statistical significance of the parameters change. Indeed, we expect
the magnitude of the estimated coeﬃcients to be diﬀerent and, in particular, larger than
that obtained including the trade elasticities on the left-hand side. We find that when the
dependent variable is NTB-core, a turns out to be 638, while αL is 0.8968, both statistically
significant at any confidence level. When we use the overall protection measure, we obtain
520 for a and 0.9351 for αL, again significant at any confidence level. This test confirms
that the elasticities used in this paper do not present relevant measurement errors able to
bias our qualitative conclusions.
Forth, we try a diﬀerent treatment of the political organization dummy. Accordingly,
instead of using Ii as defined in subsection 3.3, we use I∗i predicted by the discriminant
analysis, and treat it as exogenous. Then the model we estimate is only composed of two
equation regressions ((3) and (4)). Again our previous results are strongly confirmed (for
NTB-core: a = 118 with s.e. = 8.7072, and αL = 0.4691 with s.e. = 0.0414; for overall-
protection: a = 93 with s.e. = 11.8823, and αL = 0.3762 with s.e. = 0.0821).
Finally, we estimate the model using production data from the Eurostat - Industry,
Trade and Services. As anticipated in subsection 3.2, these data are more aggregated than
those used in our previous estimation but the number of observations is remarkably larger
(3857 rather than 1597). On the one side, this exercise enables us to verify if any systematic
error has been introduced in the reclassification of production data from the PRODCOM
system to HS. On the other, the production series from Eurostat - Industry, Trade and
Services is almost complete. Therefore, by using this series we check if our previous results
are aﬀected by systematic missing values in the PRODCOM dataset. To implement this
robustness check, zi is constructed by dividing imports (exports) for the import-competing
(export-competing) sector (6-digit) by the average production in the associated industry (4-
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digit level). In this way, however, the aggregate production value associated to trade data
for each product line tends to be systematically larger than the disaggregated one. Indeed,
the mean for zi constructed using disaggregated data is 4.38, while the mean for the same
variable obtained using aggregated data is 14.82. As a consequence we expect the estimated
a to be larger than before by a multiplicative factor of about 10. As usual we replicate this
exercise using either NTB-core or overall-protection as dependent variable. We find that in
the former case αL equals 0.5206 (s.e. = 0.0352) and a equals 1023 (s.e. = 62.4706), in the
latter αL turns out to be 0.4282 (s.e. = 0.0403) while a is 761 (s.e. = 52.8986). Previous
qualitative conclusions are thus again corroborated.
6 Conclusions
The GH (1994) model has received a great deal of attention by the international economics
literature, both from theoretical and empirical standpoints. It has been empirically tested
by several studies for the US, Turkey and Australia, obtaining support by the data; and
has oﬀered the basis to a number of extensions. However, the absence of data on political
contributions has so far made it diﬃcult to find for the EU an appropriate discrimination
strategy that enables to distinguish between organized and unorganized sectors. On the
other hand, the increasing interest showed for the European politics has produced a growing
theoretical literature on policy-making in the EU. In this paper we try to fill this gap between
theoretical aspirations and lack of reliable empirical evidence.
We suggest an original strategy to discriminate between organized and unorganized
sectors in the European Union that was absent in the literature. In doing so we treat the
EU as a single entity interpreting the spirit of the common trade policy that characterizes
(and will characterize even more in the future) the politics of the various member states.
Our results suggest that the model fits well the data. Consistently with the previous
empirical literature, we find that the weight that the government attaches upon general
welfare is several times larger than that associated to political contributions. This conclu-
sion seems sensible in our case given that the decision making process in the EU is mainly
in the hands of the Commission that is meant to be a technical and supranational body.
Hence, we expect such an institution to have a particular regard for aggregate social wel-
fare. Nonetheless, the hypothesis that the political oﬃcials are pure welfare maximizers is
rejected at a high confidence level, what hints consistency of data with the protection-for-
sale framework. On the other side, the percentage of organized groups at the European level
turns out smaller than that previously found for single country estimations. Such a result
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is not surprising, but rather in line with the experience of the European Union where lobby
formation at the supranational level represents a recent phenomenon. A smaller percentage
of the population organized in lobbies is also coherent with the large value found for the
weight attached to social welfare.
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A Detailed data appendix
NTB-core: Ad-valorem equivalent of non-tariﬀ barriers. Source: Kee et al. (2006).
Overall-protection: Composite index that combines the ad-valorem equivalent of core
NTBs with ad-valorem equivalent of the domestic support and tariﬀ barriers. Source: Kee
et al. (2006).
y: Value of production. Millions of euros. Source: Eurostat (2006b).
Imp (exp): External imports (exports) that is trading of goods between a Member State
and a non-member country. Millions of euros. Source: Eurostat (2006b).
z: Inverse of the trade penetration ratio (ratio of production value (y) over imports (imp)
if imports ≥ exports, and over exports (exp) otherwise).
e: Import-demand (export-supply) price elasticity. Source: Kee et al. (2004).
Scale: Index of industry scale given by production per enterprise. Authors’ calculations.
Source: Eurostat (2006a).
Turnover: Ratio of turnover over production value. Authors’ calculations. Source: Euro-
stat (2006a).
Long-term rentals: Ratio of gross investment in long-term rentals, operational and fi-
nancial leasing of goods over total purchases of goods and services. Authors’ calculations.
Source: Eurostat (2006a).
Tangible goods: Ratio of gross investment in tangible goods over total purchases of goods
and services. Authors’ calculations. Source: Eurostat (2006a).
Land: Ratio of gross investment in land over total purchases of goods and services. Authors’
calculations. Source: Eurostat (2006a).
Existing buildings: Ratio of gross investment in existing buildings over total purchases
of goods and services. Authors’ calculations. Source: Eurostat (2006a).
Constructions: Ratio of gross investment in constructions over total purchases of goods
and services. Authors’ calculations. Source: Eurostat (2006a).
Labor share: Share of wages and salaries in value added. Authors’ calculations. Source:
Eurostat (2006a).
Agency workers: Percentage of agency workers in total of persons employed. Authors’
calculations. Source: Eurostat (2006a).
Apprentices: Percentage of apprentices in total of persons employed. Authors’ calcula-
tions. Source: Eurostat (2006a).
Unpaid persons: Percentage of unpaid persons in total of persons employed. Authors’
calculations. Source: Eurostat (2006a).
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R&D personnel: Percentage of R&D personnel in total of persons employed. Authors’
calculations. Source: Eurostat (2006a).
Employees: Percentage of employees in total of persons employed. Authors’ calculations.
Source: Eurostat (2006a).
Social security: Ratio of social security costs over total of wages and salaries. Authors’
calculations. Source: Eurostat (2006a).
Apparent productivity: Ratio of value added over number of persons employed. Authors’
calculations. Source: Eurostat (2006a).
Personnel costs: Ratio of personnel costs over total of wages and salaries. Authors’
calculations. Source: Eurostat (2006a).
Wage: Average wage per person. Millions of euros. Authors’ calculations. Source: Eurostat
(2006a).
Share prod value: Ratio of production value of a given sector over production value in
total manufacturing. Authors’ calculations. Source: Eurostat (2006a).
Share persons employed: Ratio of number of persons employed in a given sector over
number of persons employed in total manufacturing. Authors’ calculations. Source: Euro-
stat (2006a).
Share enterprises: Ratio of number of enterprises in a given sector over number of enter-
prises in total manufacturing. Authors’ calculations. Source: Eurostat (2006a).
27
 28
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pubblicato in proprio 
Dipartimento di Economia Pubblica 
Facoltà di Economia 
Università degli Studi di Roma “La Sapienza” 
Via del Castro Laurenziano 9 – 00161 Roma 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 29
 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper del Dipartimento di Economia Pubblica 
Università degli studi di Roma “La Sapienza” 
Via del Castro Laurenziano 9 – 00161 Roma 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COMITATO SCIENTIFICO 
 
Annamaria Simonazzi (coordinatore) 
Eleonora Cavallaro 
Maurizio Franzini 
Domenico Mario Nuti 
Enrico Saltari 
Riccardo Tilli 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I Working Paper vengono pubblicati per favorire la tempestiva divulgazione, in forma 
provvisoria o definitiva, dei risultati delle ricerche sulla teoria e la politica economica. 
La pubblicazione dei lavori è soggetta all’approvazione del Comitato Scientifico, sentito il 
parere di  un referee. 
 
 
I Working Paper del Dipartimento di Economia Pubblica ottemperano agli obblighi previsti dall’art. 1 del 
D.L.: 31.8.45 n. 660. 
 
